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THREE REASONS WHY EVEN GOOD PROPERTY RIGHTS
CAUSE MORAL ANXIETY
EMILY SHERWIN*
Property is a vexing topic. Property rights play a central role in
law and human life, but they are notoriously difficult both to define
and to defend. Many ingenious arguments have been made over the
years on behalf of private control of resources, but none seems fully
satisfying as a justification for particular arrays of holdings or for
the consequences of those holdings in hard cases.
My object in this Essay is to suggest several reasons why,
entirely apart from the substantive justification for existing private
property rights, property is, unavoidably, a morally uncomfortable
subject. The problems I have in mind inhere in the relationship
between law and morality generally, but are particularly likely to
surface in the application of moral principles to property rights. As
a consequence, even if private property rights are in fact morally
justified, they are likely to generate moral unease.
To clarify the task, it may help to explain what the Essay is not
about. I am not concerned with the validity or invalidity of any
substantive theory of property rights. Nor am I concerned with the
need to rank or reconcile a plurality of moral values bearing on
property rights, although I shall comment on the relationship of
property rights to multiple conceptions of justice.' Nor does my
analysis turn on the potential conflict between individual selfinterest and collective good, although gaps between self-interest
and concern for others are sure to cause practical difficulties in
designing and implementing a morally sound system of property
* Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. Thanks to Gregory Alexander and
Larry Alexander for helpful comments.
1. For pluralist approaches to property, see, for example, LAWRENCE C. BECKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 99-107 (1977) (explaining different
justifications for property rights); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 292-314

(1990) (describing pluralist theories as "often the only way to deal honestly with the
complexity and uncertainty of moral and political life").
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rights. Instead, I shall identify a series of moral fault lines that
make it difficult to live in moral peace with private property, even
if the governing system of property rights is morally sound.
I. THE NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
To think intelligently about the relationship between property
and morality, one must first have a working definition of property.
Intuitively, and traditionally, property means control over things.2
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, the legal idea of
property was diluted to the point of extinction, at least in academic
circles. The conceptual devolution of property rights began in
scholarly writing not specifically concerned with property.3 Wesley
Hohfeld recast legal rights as paired sets ofjural relations between
persons.4 Ronald Coase characterized causation as a bilateral
conflict between activities rather than the impact of one person's
acts on the property or interests of another.5 Picking up on these
ideas, property theorists redefined property rights as legal relations
between people in regard to resources.' Some went further, arguing
that because legal relations between people in regard to resources
play out in a wide variety of contexts, property rights ultimately
amount to the outcomes of particular disputes over resources;
2. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES **1-2.
3. The erosion of traditional notions of property is described in Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Propertyin Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357,36685 (2001); Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-DimensionalProperty Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1075, 1077-80 (1997). For an excellent history of twentieth century analysis of property
rights, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 311-77 (1997).
4. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIALREASONING 35-64 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 3d ed. 1964) (1919). Hohfeld described
property rights as "multital" rights, or legal relations operating in rem against a large or
indefinite number of people. Id. at 72.
5. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2, 14 (1960).
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY: INTRODUCTORY NOTE (1936) ('The
word 'property' is used in this Restatement to denote legal relations between persons with
respect to a thing."); JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (8th ed.
2002) ("It appears, then, that 'ownership' consists of many disparate claims by [the owner]
sanctioned by law against many persons-a 'bundle of sticks,' as legal scholars sometimes
have put it."); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Propertyof the Nineteenth Century: The
Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 361-62, 366 (1980)
(describing "the new property" of the twentieth century).
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property rights exist only as the products of case-by-case decision
making by legal officials.7 At this point, nothing distinguishes
property rights from legal rights generally or gives them content in
advance of the transactions or events that give rise to disputes.8
This modern conception of property rights is inadequate to
support the benefits we expect from a system of private property.
The social functions of property rights include encouraging owners
to invest effort and capital in resource development, enabling
owners to plan for the future, and avoiding prisoners' dilemmas and
other coordination problems that lead to mismanagement of
resources.9 It is possible that some degree of legal uncertainty can
facilitate private bargaining and encourage efficient behavior. 0 Yet
if property rights are nothing but the outcomes of disputes over
7. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964)
("Property is the end result of a process of competition among inconsistent and contending
economic values.... It is ...
the value which each owner has left after the inconsistencies
between the two competing owners have been resolved."); Vandevelde, supranote 6, at 366
C'mhe particular combination of rights that comprised property in a given case would be
decided according to the circumstances."); see also LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE
MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 173-77 (2002) (suggesting that property rights are
not moral entitlements but rather the outcome of political decision making within a society).
8. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (arguing that property is not a viable
legal category); Vandevelde, supra note 6, at 361-66 (arguing that property is "merely a
bundle of legal relations").
9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-34 (6th ed. 2003);
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356-57 (1967)
(noting that "[t]he development of private rights permits the owner to economize on the use
of those resources from which he has the right to exclude others"); Robert C. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322-32 (1993) (noting importance of individual
ownership); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244-47 (1968)
(providing the classic illustration of the difficulty inherent in managing common property).
On the value of coordination, see, for example, JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 4950 (1986); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 162-66 (1991); Gerald J. Postema,
Coordinationand Convention at the Foundation of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 172-86
(1982); see also Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 995, 1006-10 (1989) (discussing the value of "indicator-rules" to
guide action).
10. See Jason Scott Johnston, BargainingUnder Rules Versus Standards,11 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 256,257-58 (1995) (suggesting that, under certain conditions, bargaining is enhanced
by vaguely defined entitlements); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,
99 HARv. L. REv. 509 (1986) (suggesting that, under certain assumptions, a regime in which
government may significantly alter property rights without compensation encourages
efficient behavior by owners).
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resources, there is no basis for investment, planning, and coordination, and no starting point for exchange or for judgments about
harm.
Lately, however, some have moved away from the skeptical
position and attempted to describe property rights in more promising ways. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, for example, have
argued that property rights operate in rem: they are not simply
bilateral relations, but rights the owner can assert against any and
all others." In other words, property rights establish a relationship
of ownership between a person and a thing, as against the world at
large. 2
My own definition places more emphasis on the form of property
rights. 3 A property right, in my view, has three essential elements:
an object, an assignment of the object to an owner, and a range of4
permitted uses that provide substantive advantages to the owner.'
To give property rights meaning and secure their functions, at least
the first two of these elements-the object of the right and its
owner-must be determinate enough to be ascertainable in advance
of a conflict over the resources in question.
When the object of a property right is a physical thing, the
properties of the thing itself give it determinate form.' 5 Nonphysical
objects-legal "things"-derive their form from determinate legal
rules.'6 Thus, a lease, an easement, a copyright, or a share of stock
can be an object of property if it is defined, by agreement or by law,
in easily comprehensible and uncontroversial terms. 7
ii. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLuM.
L. REv. 773, 777, 780-89 (2001); Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 359; see also HOHFELD,
supra note 4, at 72-74 (discussing "multital rights"); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN
LAW 25-31 (1997) (discussing the in rem nature of property rights).
12. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 11, at 777.
13. For a lengthier explanation, see Sherwin, supranote 3, at 1084-101.
14. Id. at 1087-88.
15. See id. at 1091.
16. See id. at 1088.
17. This assertion rests on the entirely plausible view that, at least within an important
core of application, language is capable of conveying determinate meaning. See, e.g., KENT
GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY 34-89 (1992) (discussing determinate standards and
principles); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132-44 (1961) (discussing how rules limit
discretion); SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 53-68 (discussing of rules and rule-following); Jules
L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy,Objectivity, andAuthority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
571-72 (1993) (discussing the determinate meaning of language); see also Lawrence B. Solum,
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Assignment of an object of property to an owner is also a function
of legal rules; the assignment is determinate if the conditions of
legal ownership are spelled out in clear terms. Property rights, as
defined here, can be owned by individuals or in common.'" Property
rights in a physical thing can be divided among owners, as in the
case of an easement and a fee in a parcel of land, as long as each
"piece" of the resource is a determinate legal thing assigned to an
ascertainable owner (or owners)."
Permissible uses present a more difficult problem. Legal rules do
not always make clear in advance of controversy the uses an owner
can make of his or her property, or the ways in which others, or the
government, may interfere. One example of indeterminacy in the
definition of permissible use is the law of nuisance, which often
calls for an ex post balance of conflicting private and public
interests; 20 another is the "essentially ad hoc" law of regulatory
takings developed by the Supreme Court.2
To avoid pointlessness, property rights must protect at least some
core of available uses, defined in a determinate way either by legal
doctrine or by reliable social and political norms. Beyond this,
however, indeterminacy with regard to use may affect the utility of
property rights,2 2 but it does not destroy their character as property
rights, distinct from other legal relations. 23 Determinate legal rules
defining objects of property and conditions of ownership guarantee
On the IndeterminacyCrisis:CritiquingCriticalDogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462,476-81(1987)
(responding to skepticism).
18. In situations ofopen access, however, there are no property rights because ownership
is not assigned. This is as it should be, because open access does not perform the social
functions associated with property rights. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of

Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1194-98 (1999) (discussing open access and
anticommons as beyond the boundaries of property).
19. See MUNZER, supra note 1, at 23 (describing easements as "limited property" that
"does not amount to ownership").
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §§ 822,826 (1979) (comparing gravity of harm
to utility of conduct).
21. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 326 (2002); Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978). In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-32 (1992), the Court moved
in the direction of greater determinacy in its takings analysis, but more recently it has
significantly limited the effect of Lucas. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 324 n.19.
22. See supranote 10 and accompanying text.
23. See supranotes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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that the designated owner is entitled to whatever substantive
benefits the law allows for the object in question. 24 General,
determinate rules also ensure that the benefits of ownership of any
defined class of legal things are available to all owners of objects
within the class, as against all others who might interfere. 25 The
full range of permissible uses attached to a class of legal things may
remain uncertain, but to the extent that permissible uses have in
fact been identified by rules or by general understanding, the owner
the owner's
is free to choose among them and others who oppose
28
choice must marshal a legal argument against it.

Property rights, therefore, consist of legal rules that define a
determinate object of property, assign the object to an ascertainable
owner, and provide for a range of available uses, at least some of
which are defined and protected by determinate rules. Understood
in this way, property rights provide a conceptual foundation for
both private exchange and claims of wrongful harm. Functionally,
they provide coordination and the sense of ownership necessary to
secure the social benefits of a system of private property.
My definition of property rights sounds rather different from
Merrill and Smith's characterization of property rights as rights in
rem.27 In fact, however, the two are closely related because generality and determinacy are the features of property rights that enable
them to operate in rem.28 To be effective against an indefinite
number of potential infringers, property rights must pertain to
recognizable objects and apply in like manner to classes of situations. Rights in rem, in other words, must be embodied in determinate rules, and determinate rules connecting control of particular
resources to individuals tend to produce rights in rem. 29 Accord
24. See Sherwin, supra note 3, at 1085.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1087-90.
27. Compare supra Part I with Merrill & Smith, supra note 11, at 783-89.
28. A possible point of divergence between the definition of property proposed by Merrill
and Smith, and my definition as stated in previous work, is the status of determinate
contract right (such as pay $100 on February 1). Merrill and Smith provide persuasive
reasons for special treatment of rights that operate in rem. See Merrill & Smith, supranote
3, at 385-97 (summarizing advantages of attention to the in rem character of property rights
for purposes of economic analysis). I continue to believe, however, that the most fundamental
characteristics of property rights are their determinacy and prospective effect.
29. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardizationin the Law of
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ingly, these two ways of understanding property rights have much
in common.
Working from my definition, property rights have two structural
attributes that bear on the problem of moral justification. First, as
indicated, property rights are rule-governed.3 ° The objects of
property rights, their assignment to owners, and at least some of
the practical benefits they carry, must be determinate, and
determinacy typically comes either from legal rules or from private
agreements backed by legal rules.3 1 Second, and relatedly, property
rights operate prospectively." Because they are embodied in
general, determinate rules, property rights predate their application to particular disputes over resources.3 3 Retrospective adjudication of disputes, in cases not governed by preexisting determinate
rules, may create property rights if adjudicative decisions have
precedential effect, but retrospective adjudication does not implement or vindicate existing property rights. These two aspects of
property rights-their dependence on rules and their prospective
effect--complicate their relationship to morality in ways that will
emerge in the following discussion.

II. MORAL DILEMMAS OF PROPERTY
Our legal system defines and protects private property rights.
The distribution of property rights recognized by law reflects a
combination of historical events of private occupancy, exchange, and
various efforts at partial redistribution carried out by government.3 4
The outcome is far from egalitarian and not easily explained by any
sensible principle of patterned distribution. 5
Property:The Numerus Clausus Principle,110 YALE L.J. 1, 24-58 (2000) (discussing the role
of standardized forms of ownership and determinate rules of trespass and nuisance in
managing information costs in a regime of in rem property rights); Merrill & Smith, supra
note 3, at 387-88, 394-97 (same).
30. See supranotes 24-25 and accompanying text.
31. See Sherwin, supra note 3, at 1088-89.
32. Id. at 1085.

33. See id.
34. See ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 311-77.
35. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 1, at 116-18 (recommending significant alterations of
existing property rights); MUNZER, supra note 1, at 227-30, 241-53 (elaborating a principle
of distributive justice); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 423-45 (1988)
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Efforts to defend this state of affairs have produced a variety of
moral arguments for private property. Private property rights are
said to follow from a natural endowment in one's labor; 6 from the
moral desert that arises from labor;3 7 from the relation of property
to personal identity; 8 or from the requirements of individual liberty
and autonomy.39 Alternatively, rules establishing property rights
are said to be justified by the instrumental contributions they make
to utility or human welfare,40 or, more narrowly, to economic and
political liberty within a society.4
One or more of these arguments, alone or in concert, may or may
not be successful in justifying the institution of private property
and some or all specific property rights protected by law. I shall set
this obviously critical question aside. The point I hope to make is
that even if property rights are morally justified, private property
is likely to generate moral unease.
There are at least three reasons why this is so. First, legal
property rights are and must be the products of determinate legal
rules.42 As such, they inevitably will diverge in some of their
applications from the moral principles that support them. Second,
property rights suffer, more than other legal rights, from problems
of transition. Most or all justifications for private property envisage

(arguing that moral theories of property rights require a significantly more egalitarian
distribution of property rights).
36. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 25-51, at 303-20 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690). For analysis of the Lockean argument, see
BECKER, supranote 1, at 33-48, and WALDRON, supra note 35, at 137-252.
37. See BECKER, supra note 1, at 48-56; MUNZER, supra note 1, at 254-91.
38. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 41-71, at 40-57 (T.M. Knox trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821); WALDRON, supranote 35, at 343-89; Margaret Jane Radin,
PropertyandPersonhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957,971-78 (1982). For analysis of Hegel-inspired
theories of property, see MUNZER, supra note 1, at 67-87.
39. See WALDRON, supra note 35, at 293-313; Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting
Approach to Property:A Renewed Traditionfor New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 125165 (2005).
40. See BECKER, supra note 1, at 57-74; JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION
109-13 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931) (1802);
MUNZER, supra note 1, at 191-226.
41. See BECKER, supra note 1, at 75-80; see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 7-21 (1962) (emphasizing the freedom-promoting principles of a free market
society).
42. See Sherwin, supra note 3, at 1085.
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secure rights on which people can and will rely.4 3 As a result,
preserving rights that are not morally justifiable at their point of
origin may have genuine moral value. Finally, property rights
expose fundamental conflicts among the different conceptions of
justice-distributive, corrective, and retributive--that guide law.4 4
A. The Dilemma of Rules
Determinacy is an essential feature of property rights as I have
defined them. The resources covered by the right, the assignment
of those resources to an owner, and at least some of the uses the
owner can make of his or her resources, must be specified in
advance, before the right is applied to particular disputes.4 5 The
determinacy of property rights enables them to provide a variety of
individual benefits, such as planning and coordination.4 6 Whether
or not these benefits have moral value in their own right, and
whether or not they are outweighed by the moral costs of private
control over resources, they are what we have come to expect from
property rights.
Except when a physical object determines its own boundaries, the
determinacy of property rights normally is a function of legal
rules.4 7 A rule, for this purpose, is a directive prescribing what
should be done in a class of situations.4 8 Behind every rule is a
purpose: the rule's prescription is supposed to further a certain end
or implement a higher-level principle.4 9 The rule's function,
however, is to settle disagreement or uncertainty about what action
the end or principle in question requires.5 ° Accordingly, a rule
43. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
44. See infra Part II.C.
45. See Sherwin, supra note 3, at 1085.
46. Demsetz, supra note 9, at 356-57.
47. See Sherwin, supra note 3, at 1088.
48. See SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 23-27. For further discussion of the nature, function,
and problems of authoritative rules, see LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF
RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 53-95 (2001); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 16-19, 22-23, 30-33 (1979); RAZ, supranote 9, at 57-62; Schauer, supra
note 9, at 42-52, 77-134.
49. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supranote 48, at 53-54.
50. See id. at 11- 15; see alsoMELVINARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW
4-7 (1988) (defending an "enrichment model" of the common law); JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE
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cannot simply restate the end or principle on which it is based; it
must prescribe, in determinate and uncontroversial terms, an
outcome or course of action that will serve that end or principle in
most of the cases covered by the rule."' It follows that the set of
actions required by the rule will not exactly match the set of actions
best calculated to meet the rule's purpose in each and every case to
which the rule applies. 2 Rules serve their ends indirectly and
imperfectly, on the suppositions that imperfection is preferable to
controversy, and that those subject to the rule will in fact make
fewer errors overall if they follow the rules than they would make
if they judged for themselves what would best serve the rule's
purpose or principle in each case.5"
The point to be drawn from this brief discussion of rules is that
property rights defined by determinate rules will diverge in some
of their applications from whatever moral purposes or principles
motivate them. Given the possibility of moral error in case-by-case
decision making, a determinate legal property right may be the best
practical means for accomplishing moral ends or implementing
moral principles. Nevertheless, the rules will sometimes produce
morally unsatisfactory results. 4
Suppose, for example, that a rule-making authority aims to
maximize human welfare, and suppose further that welfare maximization is a morally important objective. The authority concludes
that, under a given set of geological conditions, private property
rights in water will advance welfare. Accordingly, the authority
enacts a prior appropriation rule for nonnavigable surface water:
individuals who divert water for uses of their choosing have priority
over subsequent appropriators in a quantity of water measured by
the initial diversion.5
PUBLIC DOMAIN 187-92 (1994) (defending an "institutional approach" to law).
51. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 48, at 53.
52. See SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 31-34, 48-52.
53. See RAZ, supra note 9, at 70-80 (discussing the "normal justification" of rules).
54. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 48, at 55-61.
55. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS ch. 41, Scope Note (1979) (discussing prior appropriation). Riparian rights of
reasonable use are not private property rights by my standards. See id. § 850. They might,
however, amount to a property right in common if the class of riparian owners entitled to
reasonable use is well defined.
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Assume that, overall, the authority's rule is morally sound. Water
is scarce and essential to life and commerce. In the absence of welldefined property rights, potential users of water-even those who
accept the principle of welfare maximization and do their best to
implement it-would often err in judging the importance of
different water uses and estimating what other water users are
likely to do.56 The prior appropriation rule, therefore, will produce
better results overall than unregulated case-by-case decision
making. Nevertheless, the rule will cause a loss of welfare in some
situations, as when the first appropriator of water uses it less
efficiently than subsequent appropriators might have done.
The dilemma of rules, therefore, is this: a well-crafted rule, if
generally followed, may cause a net gain in welfare; at the same
time, the rule will produce results that are imperfect by the same
standard of welfare. Thus, from the point of view of the rule-making
authority, or of anyone taking an overview of prior appropriation,
it is morally correct to grant property rights to prior appropriators
and require all others to respect the prior appropriators' rights. Yet,
from the point of view of any actor who judges prior appropriation
rights to be inefficient in a particular case, respecting the right will
appear morally incorrect.5 7
This effect of rules is easiest to see when the governing moral
principle is a consequentialist principle such as welfare maximization. Yet the point applies to deontological moral principles as
well.5" Suppose that the property right granted to prior appropriators of water is based on the appropriator's moral entitlement to the
fruits of his or her labor, or is judged to be a fitting reward for the
labor of appropriation. As long as there is room for disagreement
over the scope of any appropriator's entitlement, the appropriate
reward for appropriative labor, or the moral implications of others'
interests in appropriating water, rules will be necessary to settle
56. Determinate rules are necessary even when rule subjects endorse the same abstract
moral principles and are motivated to act on them. Even under the best conditions of moral
harmony, reasoning errors and lack of coordination will lead to morally incorrect actions. See
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 48, at 232 n.4; Gregory S. Kavka, Why Even Morally
Perfect People Would Need Government, 12 SOC. PHIL. & POLVY 1 (1995).
57. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supranote 48, at 54; SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 128-34;
Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 695, 695-96 (1991).
58. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 48, at 91-92.
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controversy.5 9 To settle controversy effectively, the rules will need
to define the appropriator's moral right in determinate terms. And
the property right, so defined, will sometimes call for morally
incorrect results.6 ° When this occurs, participants and observers are
likely to find the consequences of prior appropriation rights morally
distasteful, despite the overall moral benefits prior appropriation
rights produce.
B. The Problem of Time
Property rights operate prospectively and tend to remain in
place over time.6 Their resistance to change is tied to their social
functions: political authorities enact rules of property to settle
controversy, provide coordination, and otherwise avert error. 62 To
serve these purposes effectively, property rights must be fixed in
advance of particular disputes, and the rules that define them must
be reasonably stable over time.
The prospectivity and stability of property rights may account for
a phenomenon that Jeremy Waldron has called the "normative
resilience" of property. Waldron observes that we make various
judgments about conduct based on property rights that appear to be
independent of our judgments about the institution of property
itself.6 4 For example, we treat deliberate, unauthorized takings of
property as dishonest regardless of our views about the justice or
injustice of property rights generally or the set of holdings they
protect. Moreover, property rights are especially resilient in this
way; judgments based on property rights are more likely than
judgments based on other institutions-for example, religion,
marriage, and aristocracy-to withstand negative 65
conclusions about
the justice of the institution that supports them.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 92.
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Jeremy Waldron, Property,Honesty, and Normative Resilience, in NEW ESSAYS

IN THE LEGALAND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 10, 12-17 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).

64. Id. at 12.
65. Id. at 21-31.
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The connection between normative resilience and the prospective
character of property rights is this: once determinate, prospective
property rights are in place, they take on, as Waldron says, "a
moral life of their own."66 People build family lives and businesses
in the expectation of control over a type and quantity of resources.
They endow their holdings psychologically, placing more value on
keeping them than they might have placed on acquiring the same
holdings initially.6 7 They put resources to personally important uses
and are proud of what they do with them. In other words, legal
property rights become integrated into people's lives in ways that
may be morally significant. Accordingly, loss of property, or even
the threat of loss, has a significant impact on happiness, objective
welfare, liberty, and maybe even personal identity."
Of course, those who lack resources have an interest in property
ownership as well.6" Reliance aside, resources are likely to generate
more welfare when placed in the hands of those who formerly had
few.7 ° Moreover, the arguments for redistribution are not limited to
welfare: redistribution from those who have plenty to those who do
not may provide transferees with a wider range of choice and
greater breadth for personal development. 71 A more equal distribution of goods may also be more just in and of itself. Yet, if we take
into account the effects of reliance and endowment, the costs of
abrupt and significant redistribution are enormous.7 2

66. Id. at 25.
67. See Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness To Pay and
Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparityin Measures
of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the
Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1541, 1551-53 (1998).
68. See Waldron, supra note 63, at 21-28 (discussing the psychological effects of
ownership). On the problem of transition, see generally Conference, Legal Transitions:Is
There an Ideal Way to Deal with the Non-Ideal World of Legal Change?, 13 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2003) (debating the benefits of legal change).
69. For analysis of the distributive implications of both special-rights and general-rights
theories of property, see WALDRON, supra note 35, at 423-45.
70. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 55-56, 80 (1981) (discussing the
effects of "diminishing marginal utility" of wealth in utilitarian theory).
71. See WALDRON, supra note 35, at 439 (arguing that property ownership encourages
the "development of prudence, thrift, and responsibility").
72. See Waldron, supra note 63, at 24.
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Waldron presents the normative resilience of property rights as
a moral puzzle. Normative resilience, as he describes it, represents
an inconsistency or "logical gap" between "Type 1" judgments
(judgments about the justification of property rights) and 'Type 2"
73
judgments (judgments about conduct, based on property rights),
which in turn raises questions about the enterprise of moral
justification.7 4 I doubt that the difference between Type 1 and Type
2 judgments entails a logical inconsistency; nevertheless, the
discrepancy between the initial moral status of property rights and
their moral status after a period of time is likely to result in moral
discomfort.
There are several ways to think about the normative resilience
of established property rights. Suppose, as Waldron suggests, that
people commonly make moral judgments based on property rights
although they question the justice of property as an institution.
Asked to assess the set of holdings currently protected by property
law, they might conclude that current holdings do not represent a
fair pattern of distribution, nor were they justly acquired.7 5 In
response to an act of misappropriation, however, the same people
might assert that they are entitled to their holdings and that
anyone who attempts to appropriate their holdings, or the holdings
of others, is a thief.
The apparent discrepancy between these judgments may simply
reflect a conflict between impartial morality and self-interest,
coupled, perhaps, with a sense of solidarity with other owners.76
People are personally attached to their rights over things for
prudential reasons that carry no moral weight.7 7 This attitude
73. Id. at 12-13.
74. Waldron concludes that the divergence between Type 2 and Type 1 judgments may
be justified, based on the expectations and personal attachments generated by positive law
and the centrality of property to social order: a violation of property rights signifies disdain
for the "social fabric" itself. Id. at 21-31. Yet he also suggests that the presence of normative
resilience makes efforts to justify-and, if necessary, to reform-the institution of property
more rather than less important. Id. at 31-35.
75. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-60 (1974) (discussing
patterned and nonpatterned theories of distributive justice).
76. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 7, at 177-81.
77. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, God, Morality, and Prudence, in MORALITY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ETHics 68, 71-77 (1972) (maintaining that some distinction between "the
moral and the prudential" is necessary to make sense of morality, but that "an exclusive
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presents a practical obstacle to achievement of a just system of
property rights that may be insurmountable. It does not, however,
involve a moral conflict or a logical gap between judgments.
Alternatively, both judgments may be valid moral judgments.
Existing property rights may be morally unjust, as measured by a
patterned standard of distributive justice or by historical standards
of justice in acquisition and justice in transfer. At the same time,
disruption of established legal property rights may be a moral
wrong to those who have arranged their lives around them. If this
is the case, the question becomes which of two wrongs-the wrong
of distributive injustice or the wrong of expropriation-is graver.
One possible answer is that the wrongs of distributive injustice
and expropriation are incommensurable in the sense that no metric
or scale permits a comparison of the values at stake.7" If so, then,
although they may not be morally equal, neither can be judged to
be morally better or worse than the other and no choice between
them can be morally justified.7 9 Normative resilience reflects this
state of affairs: we choose to protect existing holdings because
expropriation is wrong, and our Type 2 judgments are based on this
choice. Yet, because the distributive justice that results is no less
wrong, we also form Type 1 judgments about the injustice of the
institution of property. Moral dissatisfaction with property rights
is an obvious result.
A second answer is that the choice between expropriation and
distributive justice presents a moral dilemma: the distributive
injustice that results from a decision to protect current holdings is
morally wrong, even if expropriation would be a more serious
wrong. 0 On this view, a morally correct choice is possible, but it
does not alter the wrongful character of the course of action

disjunction between the prudential and the moral" is "quite unrealistic").
78. See RAZ, supranote 9, at 321-66 (defending the possibility of incommensurable moral
choices). For a sampling of views in the debate over incommensurability, see generally
Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998).
79. See RAZ, supra note 9, at 322-26. For a persuasive argument that if, in fact, values
are incommensurable, choices between them cannot be morally justified, see generally Ruth
Chang, Comparisonand the Justificationof Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1998).
80. See RAZ, supranote 9, at 359, 363 (discussing moral dilemmas in which the morally
right choice is wrongful).
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chosen.81 Correct resolution of the dilemma carries with it a moral
"remainder.8 2 If this position is coherent, 3 normative resilience is
readily explicable. Type 2 judgments reflect the determination that
protecting existing holdings at the cost of distributive injustice is
morally right; Type 1 judgments reflect the understanding that
current holdings are nonetheless unjust. Again, moral dissatisfaction with property rights is sure to follow.
For those who reject both incommensurability and the possibility
of moral dilemmas, normative resilience and moral discomfort with
property rights are harder to explain. On this view, the wrongs of
distributive injustice and expropriation can and must be compared,
either lexically or according to a common metric, and when this has
been done, the decision that follows is morally correct.8 4 If in fact
distributive injustice is the graver wrong, Type 2 judgments are
moral errors, perhaps abetted by self-interest.8 5 If expropriation is
the graver wrong, Type 2 judgments follow from the all-thingsconsidered conclusion that property rights should be upheld. A Type
1 judgment that the institution of property is unjust probably is
best explained as an expression of belief in the ideal of distributive
justice, and of regret that the passage of time has made it necessary
to sacrifice that ideal in the interest of more pressing moral
concerns.
Without taking a stand in the debate over incommensurability,
I find this last explanation of normative resilience to be plausible.
We do compare values and make choices in matters of political
morality. 8 We view those choices as capable of justiic ation, and,
when they are justified, we believe that acting on them is morally
correct. At the same time, we are likely to feel that choices between
moral values carry a moral cost in that one value is set aside. In
other words, moral remainder may exist as a psychological, if not
an analytical, fact. If so, any determination that present holdings
81. BERNARD WILLIAMS, Ethical Consistency, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 166, 170-75
(1973).
82. Id. at 179.
83. Chang's argument suggests otherwise. See Chang, supranote 79, at 1569-73, 1588-91.
84. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Banishingthe Bogey of Incommensurability,146 U. PA. L.
REv. 1641, 1644-46 (1998) (finding moral comparison to be both possible and necessary).
85. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
86. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 7, at 177-81.
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must prevail over distributive fairness will be accompanied by
moral unease.
C. Conflicting Ideals of Justice
The moral difficulties that arise when people rely on determinate
property rights over time may be an instance of a more general
disharmony among ideals of justice. Three forms of justiceretributive, corrective, and distributive-are commonly supposed to
motivate a morally defensible legal system.8 7 These three ideals,
however, can work at cross-purposes.
Retributive justice and corrective justice come into play when
individuals injure one another or violate each other's rights. 8
Corrective justice requires compensation for wrongful harm,
variously defined.8 9 Retributive justice ties penalties imposed on
wrongdoers to moral blameworthiness, variously defined.'
Distributive justice refers to the basic division of resources
among members of a society.9 ' Theories of distributive justice vary
widely. Using Robert Nozick's terms, some distributive theories are

87. The following discussion draws from Larry A. Alexander, Causationand Corrective
Justice:Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 L. & PHIL. 1, 2-11 (1987).
88. Corrective justice and retributive justice can conflict when the extent of harm an
injurer imposes on a victim does not correspond to the injurer's blameworthiness. See JULES
L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 324-25 (1992); Alexander, supranote 87, at 4-5; Jules L.
Coleman, On the Moral Argument for the Fault System, 71 J. PHIL. 473, 473-74 (1974)
(arguing that the doctrine of contributory fault is inconsistent with retributive justice).
89. For arguments that responsibility follows from agency and causation, see, for
example, COLEMAN, supra note 88, at 324, 374-75; Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and
Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974) [hereinafter
Epstein, Subsequent Pleas];Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of StrictLiability, 2 J.LEGALSTUD.
151, 158-60 (1973); Stephen R. Perry, Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three
Conceptions of Corrective Justice, in TORT THEORY 24, 25-26 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson &
Elaine Gibson eds., 1993).
90. See, e.g., ROBERT NoziCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 374-80 (1981) (explaining
retribution as a means of connecting the wrongdoer to correct moral values); Jean Hampton,
The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 122-47 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean
Hampton eds., 1988) (explaining retribution as a means of affirming the value of the victim);
Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution,in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE
EMOTIONS 179, 182 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (defending retribution as good in itself);
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 482-86 (1968) (explaining
retribution as a balance of moral accounts).
91. See supranotes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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"patterned." 2 Patterned theories may hold that resources should be
distributed, or redistributed, to achieve a certain end state, such as
equal shares or equal shares except insofar as unequal shares will
bring about an improvement in the position of those who are worst
off. 3 Alternatively, patterned theories may hold that resources
should be distributed according to characteristics of the holders,
such as intelligence; or that resources should be distributed on the
basis of past actions that deserve reward.9 4 Consequentialist
theories may also have implications for patterns of resource
distribution: resources might be distributed so as to maximize
future welfare, or to maximize welfare with priority given to the
welfare of those who are worst off.9"
Other theories of distributive justice are historical rather than
patterned.' Nonpatterned historical theories of entitlement hold
that current holdings are just if they were fairly acquired.9 7 In other
words, justice in acquisition and transfer, rather than the justice of
any current pattern of holdings, is the focus of moral concern.
Working within the most common and plausible conceptions of
retributive, corrective, and distributive justice, a brief analysis will
show that discord among the forms of justice is likely.9" Moreover,
discord among the forms of justice is most evident in the context of
disputes about property. When such conflicts occur, the problems of
commensurability and moral dilemma discussed above are once
again in play.99 In this Section, I shall assume that the values at
92. The taxonomy used here is, roughly, Robert Nozick's. See NOZICK, supra note 75, at
156-57.
93. See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1971); see also MUNZER, supra note 1, at
241-53 (proposing a principle that would ensure a minimum level of resources to all and limit
permissible inequality).
94. See BECKER, supra note 1, at 81-86 (discussing the view that property should belong
to those who are worthy of ownership).
95. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianismand Prioritarianism,110 ETHICS
339, 343-45 (2000) (describing prioritarianism and "responsibility-catering prioritarianism").
96. See NOZICK, supra note 75, at 150-53.
97. Id. at 153.
98. Some variants of retributive, corrective, and distributive justice may be mutually
reconcilable. For example, a patterned theory of distributive justice based exclusively on
moral desert might be reconcilable with retributive justice, but retributive principles would
control and distributive justice would not survive as a freestanding ideal. See Alexander,
supra note 87, at 4.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 78-85.
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stake are capable of comparison and that conflicts can be resolved
by fixing moral priorities. Nevertheless, tradeoffs in the currency of
justice are likely to contribute to moral dissatisfaction with
property rights.
Friction among the three forms of justice is easiest to see when
the community has adopted a nonconsequentialist patterned
principle of distributive justice, because both corrective justice and
retributive justice upset patterns of distribution.' 0 To see this,
suppose that the governing distributive principle holds that each
member of the community should have an equal share of the
external goods important to human life, and suppose further that
the community has achieved this ideal. At this point, an injury
occurs: one person harms another in such a way that the principle
of corrective justice requires compensation. Unless the injurer
realized a gain precisely equal to the victim's loss, compensation
will result in unequal shares of goods. In a simple case of theft, the
injurer's gain may in fact mirror the victim's loss, although even
here the victim's temporary loss, and the cost to the victim of
obtaining compensation, may not match the costs incurred by the
wrongdoer in defending against the victim's claim and providing
compensation. In the more typical case of accidental infliction of
harm, gain and loss are likely to diverge substantially, resulting in
significantly unequal shares of goods after corrections are made."'
Similarly, retributive penalties imposed on the injurer will alter the
ideal distributive pattern unless the injurer's retributive desert is
equal to the victim's loss, and the injurer realized a gain equal to
the victim's loss, and the penalty is remitted to the victim.0 2
In these circumstances, if the patterned distributive ideal takes
precedence, there is almost no room at all for principles of corrective
and retributive justice to operate. If, on the other hand, corrective
and retributive justice take priority, the community's distributive

100. See Alexander, supra note 87, at 6-7; see also NOZICK, supranote 75, at 160-64 (noting
that voluntary exchange upsets distributive patterns).
101. A negligent driver, for example, saves the cost in time and money of greater care, but
these saved costs are unlikely to match the costs incurred by a pedestrian the driver happens
to hit. See COLEMAN, supra note 88, at 370.
102. Even then, the penalty imposed on the injurer may affect the holdings of the injurer's
innocent family members.
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ideal must give way. °3 It may be that the morally best choice is to
give precedence to compensation for injuries and punishment of
wrongdoers, as our legal system does. Yet the community will never
be fully satisfied with the distribution of resources among its

members. 114
When distributive justice tracks a broad consequentialist principle, the distributive pattern dictated by that principle overrides
all contrary considerations. Suppose, for example, that the community has settled on the principle that resources should be divided
among its members in a way that will maximize aggregate human
welfare, and suppose further that governing authorities have
devised a means of measuring welfare. In this community, corrective justice and retributive justice cannot operate as freestanding
principles of justice. A legal system that requires injurers to
compensate their victims for harm done and imposes penalties on
wrongdoers according to some notion of desert may in fact maximize
welfare. 0 5 If so, the ideal pattern of distribution in a welfaremaximizing community will accommodate something like corrective
and retributive justice. Corrective and retributive justice, however,
are not the grounds for legal remedies; nor do they impose independent constraints on legal remedies.' If compensation or desertbased penalties conflict with the goal of welfare maximization, they
must give way. If welfare can be maximized by requiring injurers
to make supercompensatory payments to their victims, or by
punishing innocent defendants, or even by bribing potential injurers
not to inflict injuries, welfare maximization again prevails.0 7 In a
community of resolute act consequentialists, these results may
seem perfectly sensible: whatever maximizes welfare is, without
reservation, morally right. In an ordinary community, however,
people are likely to internalize the as-if principles of corrective and
103. See supratext accompanying note 100.
104. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
105. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 9-15 (1998) (finding a correspondence between rights and
utility); Richard A. Epstein, The UtilitarianFoundationsof Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 713, 714-18 (1989) (same).
106. See COLEMAN, supra note 88, at 287-88, 326-27.
107. See Alexander, supranote 87, at 2; Joel Feinberg, The ClassicDebate, in PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 727 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed. 2000).
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retributive justice espoused by the legal system. If so, cases in
which welfare maximization trumps fair compensation or just
desert will appear morally distasteful, even when they are morally
correct.
The problem of moral dissatisfaction assumes a somewhat
different form if the governing authority determines that the best
means of maximizing welfare is to adhere without exception to what
corrective justice and retributive justice would require in the
absence of a principle of welfare maximization. The authority, in
other words, may conclude that, given the errors that are likely to
occur if legal officials attempt to maximize welfare case by case,
unqualified principles of corrective and retributive justice will work
indirectly to maximize welfare. The difficulty now is that, because
corrective and retributive justice maximize welfare indirectly, a
legal system enforcing them without exception will sometimes reach
results in particular cases that contradict the community's foundational principle of welfare maximization. Thus, we are back to the
problem of rules: the best welfare maximizing rules-in this case
rules that exactly mimic corrective and retributive justice-will
produce a certain number of morally erroneous, and therefore
08
unsettling, results.
As a final example, suppose the community endorses a purely
historical, nonpatterned principle of distributive justice, and
suppose further that current holdings meet that principle's
requirements of justice in acquisition and justice in transfer. It
might seem that in these circumstances corrective justice and
retributive justice can operate in harmony with distributive
justice. 0' 9 Once justified holdings are in place, corrective justice and
retributive justice are part of the continuing history that determines just entitlements at any point in time.
Yet, even a nonpatterned distributive principle may be at odds
with corrective and retributive justice. One question is whether
retributive justice implies a more general principle of desert-based
allocation of goods and is thus inherently inconsistent with
historical entitlements that are indifferent to the desert of
108. See supra text accompanying note 57.
109. I set aside for this purpose inconsistencies between corrective justice and retributive
justice. See supra note 88.
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holders."n Some of the standard arguments offered to explain the
origins of private property rights are desert-based, in1 but others are
not. Locke's primary defense of private property, for example, is
based not on the assumption that laborers deserve the reward of
property, but on the assumption that laborers have a natural
entitlement to their bodies and hence to the fruits of their labor.'
Moreover, even when initial acquisition of entitlements is explained
in terms of desert, the nature of the reward-exclusive control of
resources that are or may become scarce-makes it impossible to
reward all deserving acts with property rights." 3
A more specific problem is that the forms of legal protection
implied by the notion of historical entitlement may not correspond
to the remedies prescribed by principles of corrective and retributive justice. To make entitlements secure, it may be necessary to
provide compensatory remedies for harm that was not wrongfully
inflicted or to impose criminal sanctions on nonculpable actors.
Consider, for example, Joel Feinberg's backpacker puzzle: 114 A
backpacker stranded in a blizzard comes upon a cabin. The
backpacker breaks in, consumes food, and destroys furniture for
firewood, all of which he must do in order to survive the storm.
What the backpacker did was justified, all things considered, and
the cabin owner, if present, may not have been at liberty, legally or
morally, to exclude the stranded backpacker." 5 At the same time,
intuition suggests that the backpacker must compensate the owner
of the cabin for the harm he caused; otherwise, ownership would
mean nothing in the face of others' needs, and others will always
have needs." 6 To explain compensation from the backpacker to the
cabin owner as an instance of corrective justice, one must say that
a duty to compensate arises when an injurer infringes, but does not
110. See Alexander, supra note 87, at 3 (questioning whether retributive justice is
"consistent with the existence of a distributive system not based on moral merit").
111. See BECKER, supra note 1, at 48-56; MUNZER, supra note 1, at 254-91.
112. LOCKE, supra note 36, at 305-06; see WALDRON, supra note 35, at 177-91.
113. See BECKER, supra note 1, at 54-55; MUNZER, supra note 1, at 267-75; WALDRON,
supra note 35, at 204, 209-10.
114. Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasiaand the InalienableRight of Life, 7PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 93, 102 (1978). Jules Coleman provides a similar illustration in which a diabetic takes
insulin belonging to another. See COLEMAN, supra note 88, at 282-83, 292.
115. See COLEMAN, supra note 88, at 300-01.
116. See id. at 302; Feinberg, supra note 114, at 102.
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violate, a right;' 17 or that harm itself generates a duty to compensate without the need for a wrong." 8 These explanations, however,
are circular in the sense that the duty to compensate is defined by
the entitlement itself: corrective justice has no independent
normative role.' 1 9 Moreover, to the extent that corrective justice,
like retributive justice, acts as a constraint on the burdens that law
can justly place on injurers, compensation to the cabin owner
constraint: an actor who has done the right things is
exceeds that 12
pay.
to
made
A similar point can be made in connection with criminal sanctions. Criminal penalties for intentional taking or destruction of
property may be necessary to make historical entitlements meaningful: the threat of penalties gives the owner effective control by
discouraging others from using the resources in question without
the owner's consent.' 2' In exigent circumstances, however, appropriation may not be morally wrong. It follows that criminal penalties
for the appropriation are not supportable on retributive grounds.
Larry Alexander provides this example:
A, a mean-spirited person, has an entitlement (through inheritance, say) to a rowboat. B, a child, is drowning. C takes A's
rowboat over A's protest to rescue B, thus violating A's rights.
C's act is "wrong," but what is Cs culpability? C deserves praise
not blame and punishment, although C violated a
and reward,
122
right.
Again, the result is a moral conflict: either the governing principle
of distributive justice is dishonored, or punishment is inflicted on
a person who has done the right thing. One conception of justice

117. See COLEMAN, supranote 88, at 282, 299-302; Feinberg, supra note 114, at 102.
118. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 89, at 160; see also Epstein,
Subsequent Pleas, supranote 89 (arguing for "an alternative to the law of negligence within

the tradition that views the tort law as a system of corrective justice").
119. See Alexander, supra note 87, at 4-11.
120. See COLEMAN, supranote 88, at 387-95 (implying that corrective justice places some
constraints on allocation of the costs of injuries, but only very weak constraints).
121. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (1972).
122. Alexander, supra note 87, at 3.

1950

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1927

must give way to the other, and the choice between them is likely
to produce a sense of moral regret.
To summarize, under most or all plausible versions of distributive justice an ideal distribution of goods will sometimes conflict
with other ideals of justice. When this occurs, the community must
choose which aspect of justice should take priority, either generally
or in specific settings.' 2 3 If there is in fact such a thing as moral
regret in the wake of morally correct decisions, choices of this kind
are likely to result in moral discomfort with property rights.'2 4
Conflicts among the different forms of justice that motivate law
are, of course, a problem for law generally and not just for the law
of property. Disputes over property rights, however, are likely to
reveal these conflicts in a way that tort or contract disputes are not.
Legal rules in the fields of tort, crime, and contract focus on
transactions: given the current distribution of goods, how can we
reduce accident costs, compensate injuries, deter wrongdoing,
impose just punishment, encourage efficient trade, or honor
intentions? In contrast, property law necessarily confronts the
problem of distribution because it assigns control of particular
resources (physical things or legal things) to owners. Property law
also bears on transactions, insofar as property rights define harm
and provide the basis for trade. Because property rights simultaneously implicate distributive, corrective, and retributive justice,
they are likely to expose the fault lines among ideals of justice and
to incur moral discredit when those ideals collide.
CONCLUSION
The formal requirements of property rights, the effects of reliance
on property rights over time, and conflicts among the different
ideals of justice implemented through property rights mean that
property rights are morally imperfect even when morally justified.
This is not to suggest that the current array of property rights is
the morally best set of rights possible; the point is that even the
best set of property rights would still be morally unsatisfying in
some ways.
123. See MUNZER, supra note 1, at 78-83.
124. See supra Part II.A.
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As a consequence, actors implementing property rights and
judges enforcing property rights must either accept some morally
regrettable outcomes in order to maintain the moral benefits of
property; or disregard property rights when regrettable outcomes
occur and, in doing so, lose the moral benefits of property. Accepting
regrettable outcomes is morally distasteful, but pursing ideal
outcomes is morally suboptimal. This is a general problem for law,
but one whose effect on property rights, as I have defined them, is
especially pronounced.

